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Concerns about education quality motivate the implementation of accountability 
policies to hold administrators, teachers and students responsible for academic achievement. 
The rationale for this strategy is that the promise of rewards or the threat of sanctions are 
needed to ensure change and set clear standards to promote educational change. The rise in 
accountability has increasingly led schools and teachers to rely on summer and remediation 
courses to help low-achieving students meet minimum standards. This paper assesses the 
effects on academic performance of a major remedial education reform in Italy. 
Starting from the year 2007/08, students at secondary school lagging behind predefined 
standards of performance must attend remedial summer courses. Progression to the next 
grade is conditional on passing an exam before the new school year. This rule replaced a 
system in which the practice of social promotion was effectively at work. Before the reform 
students could be admitted to the next grade with an ‘educational debt’ (debito formativo) 
signalling lack of expected achievement, but with limited implications for progression 
across grades. Moreover, the reform gave to remedial education a more prominent role in 
the formative plan, making it mandatory during the year and in the summer. 
The policy question addressed in this paper is whether mandating remedial summer 
courses for low-achieving students, and making admission to the next grade conditional on 
exams after the summer, makes a difference. In particular, we study the short-term effects 
on academic achievement, and how these are mediated by possible changes in school and 
teacher inputs. Our empirical strategy exploits the quasi-experimental variation resulting 
from a geographic discontinuity in the implementation of the reform. Unlike the rest of the 
country, schools located in a well-defined area of Northern Italy, the province of Trento, 
were exempted from adopting the new progression system. We use this setting to obtain 
counterfactual quantities and draw causal conclusions. 
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Remedial exams were introduced in Italy in 1923, and were abolished in secondary 
schools during the 1990s. Their reintroduction in 2007 resulted from political pressure after 
poor performance at PISA tests. Variability in scores across regions pictured a sharp 
North/South divide, with students in the South performing well below the OECD average. 
In addition, marked differences emerged across curricular tracks, even in the best 
performing areas. Advocates of the reform believed that the threat of grade retention was 
the most effective solution: pupils would study more intensively, as they instinctively fear 
failure. This view echoes the reinforcement theory of behaviourist psychology (Staddon, 
2003). Reform opponents, instead, raised the concern that the threat of grade retention might 
undermine effort, motivation and engagement of struggling students, thus exacerbating 
inequalities.1 
We evaluate the reform using survey and administrative data from complementary 
sources of information. Scores and socio-economic indicators come from a small scale 
survey for a sample of schools located either side of the administrative border of the 
province of Trento. This information is integrated with administrative data on retention rates 
for schools in the areas considered for the analysis. The analysis employs schools of the 
province of Trento as a control group for schools located the either side of the administrative 
border. We use census and administrative data to show that schools located in “treatment” 
and “control” areas share similar demographic structure and labour market outcomes before 
the reform. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We document a large, negative effect on 
academic achievement (0.3 to 0.4 points of standard deviation) for students in technical and 
                                                            
1 Empirical evidence suggests that intrinsic motivation (Fortier et al., 1996; Pintrich, 2003), social origins 
(Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Bowles and Gintis 2002), parents’ behaviour and 
expectations (Englund et al., 2004), teachers’ expectations (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Rubie-Davies et 
al., 2006), and assessment practices (Machin and McNally, 2005) are pivotal in the learning process. 
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vocational schools, but no effect in academic schools. Our data show that, before the reform, 
about 40% of students in the areas considered had at least one ‘education debt’. We argue 
that the size of the “marginal” group (i.e., students whose behaviour is affected by the 
reform) is large, and represents the large majority of the class if social externalities are at 
work. 
We go beyond averages, and assess how the reform affected achievement across 
quantiles of the score distributions. We find that much of the variability in the effect is 
captured through the stratification by curricular track, with low within track differences 
across students. Most interestingly, we find more pronounced negative effects for females 
in non-academic schools. Results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks on the 
functional form and the estimation method adopted. Consistent with Betts and Grogger 
(2003), our first contribution is to show that higher standards coming with the threat of 
sanctions exacerbate inequality in the distribution of educational achievement, resulting in 
both winners and losers. 
Second, we find that the reform induced adaptive behaviour of schools and, possibly, 
of their teachers, causing less stringent rules for grade progression (which in Italy is not 
based on standardised testing). We argue that this follows from the mandatory organisation 
of remedial summer courses, which impact importantly on school budgets. Despite the 
negative effects on scores, we find that the reform increased the fraction of students admitted 
to the next grade in non-academic schools. The same result holds up for academic schools, 
although significance in this case depends on the specification considered. We conclude that 
schools reacted to the reform by admitting to the next grade students who, with the old rules, 
would be given the ‘educational debt’. We use this result to argue that the effects on scores 
mask important changes of schools’ and teachers’ behaviour. How the introduction of 
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remedial courses and exams affects outcomes is ambiguous, and depends on both schools’ 
and students’ behaviour. 
Finally, we perform back of the envelope calculations to infer the long term effects of 
the reform on graduation rates. We exploit another reform that was the mirror image of the 
intervention considered here. This reform was implemented in 1994/95, and introduced the 
practice of social promotion by abolishing the same summer remedial exam considered 
here. We use survey data from the Bank of Italy to set out the comparison of cohorts of 
individuals aged 14 during the 1990s, this being the modal age for completing compulsory 
schooling at the time. Our results point to no effect of the threat of grade retention 
represented by the remedial exam on secondary school graduation rates. All in all, results 
weigh against the effectiveness of the remediation policy considered here. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. A review of the literature is 
presented in the next section. Institutional background and reform are discussed in Section 
3. Section 4 presents data and evaluation design. Section 5 states the identifying conditions 
required to ensure the causal validity of our findings. Results are reported in Section 6. 
Conclusions and policy implication are discussed in Section 7. Additional materials are 
presented in the Appendix. 
2. Literature review and implications for the empirical analysis 
The desirability of grade retention policies to remediate poor performance is not 
uncontroversial. The push for educational accountability in the recent years has brought this 
problem back to the forefront. A large number of studies have looked into this issue, but 
quasi-experimental evidence is still relatively scarce (notable exceptions are Jacob and 
Lefgren, 2004 and 2009). Studies rigorously designed to control for selection bias fail to 
demonstrate that grade retention is more beneficial than grade promotion, for both academic 
and socio-emotional outcomes (see Jimerson, 2001). Our paper marks something of a 
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departure from this literature. In our setting the quasi-experimental comparison of students 
undergoing different progression rules reveals the increased threat of grade retention, not 
actual retention.2 
As the reform we consider mandated remedial courses for low-achievers, the literature 
on the effects of remedial education is relevant to our study. Lavy and Schlosser (2005) 
consider a remedial intervention for high school students in Israel, finding a significant 
increase in matriculation rates. Calcagno and Long (2008) consider the impact of post-
secondary remediation programmes in Florida, finding that mathematics and reading 
courses have mixed benefits on performance. Battistin and Meroni (2013) study the short 
term effects for low achieving students in Italian middle schools, and document positive 
results for math scores. De Paola and Scoppa (2014) consider remedial courses for college 
students in Italy, finding positive effects on credits. 
The interplay between incentives faced by students and academic achievement is also 
important. Effort, total time devoted to study and engagement at school are important 
determinants of student learning (Bishop, 2004). Students choose which subject to focus on, 
and decide how much effort to put into each task. Depending on the incentives facing 
students, one may expect sizeable differences in decisions about effort. The available 
evidence suggests that determinants of effort vary a great deal across school tracks. 
Carbonaro (2005) finds that students in academic tracks exert substantially more effort than 
do students in non-academic tracks. Hastings et al. (2012) provide quasi-experimental 
evidence that school choice has sizeable effects on motivation and performance of low 
income and minority students. Raising the bar may have heterogeneous effects on effort, 
with negative consequences if standards move beyond a student’s reach. Betts and Grogger 
                                                            
2To the best of our knowledge, the closest in spirit to our paper is the work by Belot and Vandenberghe (2014), 
who study the effects of the threat of grade retention introduced by a reform implemented for the French 
speaking community in Belgium finding no effects on achievement. 
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(2003), for example, find that high standards have significantly larger returns on test scores 
at the top end of the ability distribution. This result may be mediated by differential effects 
on effort, as students at the bottom end of the distribution may perceive themselves as losing 
ground and give up.3 
Gender differences in the effort exerted may also be at work. Female students are more 
supportive of academic learning (see, for example, Carbonaro, 2005), implying that there 
may be positive externalities in schools with more girls. Lavy and Schlosser (2011) find that 
classes with more female students perform better, with higher scores for the most 
disadvantaged students. They argue that gender composition affects learning climate and 
inter-student relationships in the class. This should affect positively non-cognitive factors 
like motivation and concentration and thus, indirectly, learning. The effects of assessment 
mode on measured achievement also present significant gender differences. Machin and 
McNally (2005) document lower scores for girls after the introduction of continuous 
assessments in the UK National Curriculum. Gipps and Murphy (1994) show lower 
performance of girls in timed examinations because of higher anxiety. Powney (1996) 
reviews a number of studies documenting that the mode of assessment is a factor explaining 
the differential performance of male and female students. 
These findings suggest that a sensible stratification for the empirical analysis is by 
gender and curricular track. This is what we will do in documenting our results. 
3. Institutional background and description of the reform 
Secondary schools before the reform 
Primary and secondary schooling in Italy is compulsory from ages 6 to 16, with three 
stages: 5 years of elementary school (scuola elementare), middle school covering grades 6-
                                                            
3 Betts and Grogger (2003) document differential effects of setting high standards by ethnicity, with lower 
returns on achievement for blacks. This is consistent with findings in Carbonaro (2005), who documents, 
ceteris paribus, lower effort from black students. 
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8 (scuola media), and secondary school (scuola superiore), which runs for 3-5 years. The 
reform we consider here affects students enrolled in latter stage of education, which is 
organized into academic (liceo) and technical and vocational tracks (istituto tecnico and 
istituto professionale, respectively). Teachers work in a highly regulated public sector, with 
virtually no risk of termination. Pay and promotion structure largely depend on seniority, 
and are independent of performance or conduct. 
Data from multiple PISA waves consistently picture important geographic differences 
in academic performance at secondary school across areas (OECD, 2012). Students in the 
regions considered here (Trentino, Veneto and Lombardia) have fairly homogenous 
performance, and are among the best performing students in the OECD area. This is in sharp 
contrast with poor performance of Southern regions.  
Until 2006/07 at the end of the school year (in June) students at secondary school could 
be retained, admitted to the next grade or admitted to the next grade with an ‘educational 
debt’ in one or more subjects. The ‘debt’ had to be cleared in the following years, with no 
clear deadline. Official figures show that about 42 percent of students in the country were 
given at least one ‘debt’, with just one out of four students recovering it by the end of the 
following year. Social promotion was the practice at work. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for year 2006/07 derived by the Ministry of 
Education, using areas considered for the main analysis. Separately for academic and 
technical and vocational schools, reported are the fraction of students retained, the fraction 
of students with at least one ‘educational debt’ at the end of the year, and a breakdown of 
debts assigned by subject. Figures here are for the second and third grades at secondary 
school, as this is the relevant age range for students in our sample.  
Retention rates in non-academic schools are higher, and gender disparities are clear-
cut. The difference across schools almost vanishes when it comes to ‘debts’, gender 
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remaining the most relevant factor. Over 40 percent of males are given at least one 
‘educational debt’, and this figure is roughly the same across school types. The percentage 
of females with ‘debts’ is well below that of males, and females in non-academic schools 
are marginally worse than in academic schools. The breakdown by subject reveals that 
mathematics and foreign languages were, by far, the most problematic subjects. These 
numbers, which provide a representative picture for high schools in Northern Italy in the 
early 2000s, casted doubts on the learning effectiveness of the secondary system.4  
Risk of grade retention and compliance with the reform 
The reform implemented in 2007/08, named after the Minister of Education Fioroni in 
charge at the time, has three key features. First, under the new progression system - which 
is still in operation - students must clear all ‘educational debts’ before the beginning of the 
new year (mid-September). This is a requirement for admission to the next grade. Second, 
students with a ‘debt’ must attend remedial courses organized by the school during the 
summer, and take a remedial exam in early September (the assessment mode being decided 
by the school). In June students can be retained, admitted to the next grade, or must attend 
remedial classes over the summer in preparation for the exam in September. If this is not 
passed, grade retention is deliberated by the school council. Finally, schools are held 
responsible for the organization of summer courses and remedial classes during the year. 
Remedial classes for low performing students became mandatory and part of the school 
curriculum. This additional burden was not compensated by more financial resources 
transferred from the Ministry of Education to schools. It is well known that Italy marks a 
                                                            
4 According to PISA 2000 data, Italy ranked above Spain, Portugal and Greece but far behind the most 
advanced countries. The average score of Italian students was 100 points lower than that of top-ranking Korean 
students (OECD 2001). The public concern became widespread after the PISA 2003 results for mathematics, 
when the overall performance of Italian students dropped below that of Spain and Portugal with an average 
score of 86 points lower than that of their Finnish peers (OECD 2004). The overall picture was confirmed in 
the PISA 2006 survey (OECD 2007). 
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departure from the OECD average, as spending per student increased by only 0.5% in real 
terms between 1995 and 2010 (OECD, 2013). 
Using its special autonomy from the central Italian government, the province of Trento 
in Northern Italy did not comply with the reform. Academic performance of students at 
PISA tests, as good as in top-performing OECD countries, and high appreciation for local 
secondary schools were at the origin of this decision.5 In contrast with the rest of the country, 
schools in the province must organize courses for students with ‘educational debts’ at the 
beginning of the new year (thus leaving the summer free for teachers, students and their 
families), and lack of minimum academic standards in some subjects would not necessarily 
imply grade retention. Local principals, teachers, policy makers and politicians viewed the 
enforcement of summer courses as an excessive sanction, with possible negative 
externalities on students’ learning and motivation in the secondary school cycle. 
The reform introduced major changes to school accountability but ceteris paribus 
increased risk of grade retention for students outside the province of Trento. Progression of 
students with ‘educational debts’ before the reform, about 40% in the areas considered (see 
Table 1), is made conditional on additional instruction time – during the year and in the 
summer – and a final exam in September. Peers on the other side of the discontinuity border 
bear the cost of longer hours of remedial education, but with no obvious impact on grade 
progression. Making promotion conditional on the exam in September represents a real 
threat, not just additional time spent studying during the summer. Of course there may be 
additional (monetary and non-monetary) costs coming from the time spent studying during 
the summer, which extend to families and schools as well. 
                                                            




Heterogeneous effects mediated by changes in effort and/or motivation are therefore 
one expected outcome. The reform may have represented a negative stimulus to 
commitment for students from lower social classes, for example because of their smaller 
opportunity cost of dropping out (Boudon 1974, and Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997). 
Differential effort across school subjects may be expected as well, with more investment 
where the threat is highest. Adaptive behaviour on the side of students is not the only 
possibility, of course, as schools and teachers may react to the administrative burden and 
increased costs by rationally exerting lower effort. 
4. Evaluation design and data 
Selection of towns 
The evaluation design considers towns close to the administrative border relevant for 
the reform. The province of Trento consists of few urban centres, and many rural suburbs 
and mountain villages with different population demographics. It is bordered by the regions 
of Veneto to the South-East, Lombardy to the West, and Tyrol to the North, as shown in 
Figure 1. The criteria followed to guide selection were: (i) presence of schools for each 
curricular track in secondary education, (ii) population size, and (iii) economic and 
occupation structure.  
Condition (i) restricts the eligible set to the local capital, Trento, and few remaining 
urban centres. Excluding those with mountain villages and valleys in school catchments, 
which hardly are comparable to surrounding regions, the choice is reduced to three urban 
towns. The final selection includes the capital Trento and the towns of Riva del Garda and 
Rovereto, as shown in Figure 1. The area considered covers approximately two fifth of the 
province population. 
For each of these three towns, we looked for the closest match among centres outside 
the administrative border (restricting the search to seventy kilometres from the boundary). 
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Here too the choice is constrained once conditions (ii) and (iii) are imposed. Given the small 
number of towns usable for the comparison, we didn’t apply any statistical procedure to 
form pairs. We matched the capital Trento to Bolzano, the capital of South Tyrol (to the 
North). The town of Riva del Garda was matched to Desenzano del Garda, to the South. 
This is the only urban centre of comparable size, and the economies of both towns rely 
heavily on tourism. Finally, the relatively more industrial town of Rovereto was matched to 
the town of Schio, to the East.  
The pairs constructed present very similar population size and age structure, as Figure 
2 shows. We report, for each pair, time series of population size, share of working age 
population and labour force structure (defined as ratio of elderly to young workers) from 
census data and official publications from the Italian National Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 report demographics and selected labour market statistics. 
Educational attainment and occupational structure are remarkably similar across towns, for 
both young adults (aged below 30) and working-age population. Share of immigrants of 
secondary school age (13 to 18) is also comparable. 
Selection of schools 
We followed a one-to-one matching procedure, considering similar public schools 
located in each pair. Our choice is somewhat restricted by the population size of towns in 
the sample.6 The selection was conducted by controlling for quantitative dimensions such 
as curricular track, school size as measured by trends in enrolment and school resources, as 
well qualitative dimensions as school `reputation’. The final sample includes 22 schools, 
almost 60% of existing secondary schools in the towns of interest. We selected 6 schools in 
                                                            
6 For example, education received in academic schools (liceo) depends on the field of study (e.g., humanities 
or science). There is typically one academic institution per field in the towns considered, excluding private 
institutions and German institutions in Bolzano.  
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Trento and Bolzano (from a total of 9 and 7, respectively); 2 schools in Riva del Garda and 
Desenzano del Garda (from a total of 3 and 6); and 3 schools in Rovereto and Schio (from 
a total of 7 in both towns). Table 4 below shows that schools in the sample share the same 
outcomes with schools in the same towns not selected for this study (see the next section 
for details). 
We focused on students in second and third grade at secondary school during the year 
2008/09, thus aged between 15 and 16. For each school we randomly selected two classes 
in the second year (i.e. for the cohort of students enrolled for the first time in school year 
2007/08) and two classes in the third year (i.e. for the cohort of students enrolled for the 
first time in school year 2006/07). We did so to ensure variability in the duration of 
enrolment at school across different regimes defined by the reform. The cohort dimension, 
however, proved statistically not important in the analysis, and will not be considered in 
what follows. Size of the working sample is presented in Table 2: number of students is 916 
and 842 outside and inside the province of Trento, respectively, evenly distributed across 
curricular tracks. 
Test scores and administrative data 
Standardised testing for evaluation purposes is a recent development in Italy. The 
Italian Istituto Nazionale per la Valutazione del Sistema dell’Istruzione (INVALSI), a 
government agency charged with educational assessment, piloted voluntary assessments in 
2008, which became mandatory for all schools from 2009. The lack of standardized scores 
for the period considered here forced us to collect our own data. 
We combine school administrative databases (teachers’ marks and information on 
promotion/retention) and information from two surveys designed for this study. The first is 
a small-scale survey shaped around PISA, and contains standardised scores for all students 
in our sample. The second survey – administered to parents – contains information on 
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household demographics such as education, labour market position, occupational standing, 
composition and learning resources at home. Data on test scores and demographics are 
referred to as “Main Sample”. The test was developed from publicly released items from 
the first three PISA assessments available at the time that this research started (2000, 2003 
and 2006). The procedure was supervised by experts of the Ministry of Education to 
guarantee comparability with PISA. The test was conducted at the beginning of 2008/09 
(between October and November 2008).7  
Standardized achievement is linked to teacher marks for past years at school, as well as 
to results at the final examination of middle school.8 We also use administrative data from 
local government agencies and the Ministry of Education on retention rates for 2006/07, 
2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10 in the areas considered. We construct longitudinal 
information for the same schools included in the main sample, and study changes in 
retention rates from before to after the reform over and above school- and grade-specific 
effects. The information for 2006/07, the only pre-reform year we were able to gather, is 
used to test for pre-existing differences between sampled schools in the areas considered 
(see Table 4 below). 
5. Estimation 
The evaluation design for the effects on scores sets up the cross-sectional comparison 
of outcomes for schools in the province of Trento, to outcomes in similar schools of adjacent 
areas. The identifying restriction is that schools near the administrative border would have 
had the same outcomes had the reform not been implemented (see, for example, Heckman 
                                                            
7The items were presented to students in three one-hour booklets, resulting in a three-hour session with 23 
units for reading, 20 for mathematics and 19 for science. All students in our sample took the same tests. 
8 We investigated the possible sorting effects deriving from the choice of curricular track at high school across 
the areas considered in our analysis. We computed the average transition rates from middle school to liceo for 
the school year 2007/08 using official data from the Ministry of Education. This analysis pictured rather 
similar figures in the areas considered, with transition rates ranging between 29 and 34 percent. 
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and Vytlacil, 2007). We report estimates the following parametric regression from the 
“Main Sample”: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,     (1) 
which is estimated separately by gender and curricular track. The variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is score of 
student i (reading, math and science), 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for schools outside the province of 
Trento, and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 are demographics reported in Table 3 below. Standard errors are clustered 
on class. Results are presented in Table 6.  
We consider semi-parametric alternatives to this specification, which we use to check 
the sensitivity of our conclusions to the estimation method. First, the average effect of 
interest is estimated through a matching estimator. Matching is implemented using the 
propensity score obtained from a probit regression of “treatment” status on 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. The two 
groups of students contrasted have similar distributions of observables, ruling out common 
support problems in the data. Second, we employ the propensity score to estimate the 
average effect through a weighting estimator (see Imbens, 2004). We additionally check the 
robustness of our findings by dropping few observations “off support” considering the 
propensity score metric.9 The various sensitivity checks yield results equivalent to those 
obtained from the estimation of the parametric regression in (1), in terms of both point 
estimates and statistical significance. Because of this, we decided to report only parametric 
estimates while presenting the results in the following sections. Estimation results obtained 
using the weighting procedures are presented in Table A.1 of the Appendix. 
In estimating quantile treatment effects from the “Main Sample”, we fit the standard 
quantile regression counterpart of equation (1). Results from this analysis are presented in 
Figure 5. We check the sensitivity of our findings to alternative estimation methods 
                                                            
9 Propensity score distributions across groups are reported in Figure A.4 of the Appendix. We dropped 56 
observations off support. 
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employed in the programme evaluation literature (see, for example, Firpo, 2010), and results 
are very similar to those in the main text (see Figure A.1 of the Appendix). 
When considering administrative data, the availability of longitudinal information from 
2006/07 to 2009/10 allows us to consider a differences in differences strategy. For this 
reason, the variability employed in equation (2) below is different from that in equation (1). 
We estimate the following regression separately for academic and non-academic 
institutions: 
𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝛼𝛼0(𝑔𝑔, 𝑗𝑗, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼1𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝜈𝜈𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔,   (2) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is outcome (e.g., retention rate) in grade g for school j at time t, 𝛼𝛼0(𝑔𝑔, 𝑗𝑗, 𝑡𝑡) is 
shorthand for grade, school and time effects, 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 is dummy for post reform periods, 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔 is an 
indicator for reform areas, and 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is grade enrolment. Standard errors are clustered on 
school and enrolment cohort, and results are reported in Table 7. 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Students in the two areas share very similar demographics, as shown in Table 3. The 
following variables are considered: (i) student demographics (gender, age, dummy for 
foreign students, dummy for cohabitation with mother and father, proximity to school) (ii) 
socio-economic background of the household (father’s age and education, mother’s age and 
education, dummy for homemakers, dummy for mother or father unemployed), (iii) 
household wealth and social-status (occupational scale scores, material deprivation 
index).10 Means and standard deviations are reported, stratifying observations by curricular 
track and policy status. All in all, the distribution of demographics is fairly balanced, 
                                                            
10 The socio-economic status is measured using an Italian occupational stratification scale (De Lillo and 
Schizzerotto 1985) to proxy social standing of different jobs. The life style deprivation index (Whelan et al., 
2002) is an additive index based on the lack of 5 items in the household: television, car, DVD player, computer, 
internet access. Each individual item is weighted by the proportion of households possessing that item in Italy. 
Weights were derived from the SILC 2006 survey for Italy. 
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although some exceptions emerge (e.g., education of mothers). Results in Table 3, coupled 
with the evidence in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4, are our first attempt to corroborate the 
validity of the research design. 
The “Main Sample” doesn’t have information on scores before the reform. As such, it 
cannot be used to provide falsification tests in support of the identifying restriction 
underlying estimation of equation (1). We used PISA data to circumvent this problem. The 
Ministry of Education granted us access to information for 2003, 2006 and 2009 on the 
province where schools are located. However, the size of PISA sample ensures a small 
number of schools before (2003 and 2006) and after (2009) the reform, with different 
(academic and non-academic) institutions participating across survey waves. Moreover, as 
province represents a much broader geographic aggregation than the one considered here, 
additional confounding factors are likely to come into play.11  
To overcome the lack of standardized scores before the reform, we use administrative 
data to show two additional results. First, promotion and retention rates in towns considered 
for this study are statistically the same for schools in and out of sample. This can be seen 
from columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, where reported is the coefficient 𝛾𝛾1 from regressions 
that consider all schools in towns selected for the years available: 
𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝛾𝛾0(𝑔𝑔, 𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾1𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑔 + 𝑢𝑢𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔.   (3) 
                                                            
11 This said, and with the caveat of using an underpowered study, conclusions from this “PISA sample” are 
not against the hypothesis of parallel trends in scores pre-reform (results are not presented here for brevity; 
see Battistin and Schizzerotto, 2012). For descriptive purposes, we used this sample to investigate the 
distribution of key school inputs that may affect scores in the two areas. Student to teacher ratio and proportion 
of girls in the class are roughly comparable around the administrative border, and stable over time. In academic 
schools the teacher to pupil ratio is 8.65 and 8.01 inside and outside the province of Trento, respectively. The 
corresponding figures for non-academic schools are 6.49 and 7.27. The proportion of girls in sensibly lower 
in non-academic schools: about 44 percent in the province of Trento, and 41 percent outside this province. In 
academic schools, the proportion is about 66 percent and stable across areas. We conclude that the 
stratification by curricular track controls for different learning environments in the class (e.g., see Carbonaro, 
2005, and Lavy and Schlosser, 2011). 
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The outcome 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is regressed on a dummy for being a school in the sample, 𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔, controlling 
for grade and time fixed effects, 𝛾𝛾0(𝑔𝑔, 𝑡𝑡), grade enrolment, 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, and an indicator for 
academic institutions, 𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑔. Second, we keep only schools in the sample, and show that before 
the reform promotion and retention rates were similar either side of the administrative 
boundary. We estimate the following equation using data for 2006: 
𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2006 = 𝛿𝛿0(𝑔𝑔) + 𝛿𝛿1𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2006 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑧𝑧𝑔𝑔 + 𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2006,   (4) 
where 𝛿𝛿0(𝑔𝑔) is shorthand for grade fixed effects, and report the coefficient 𝛿𝛿1 in columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 4. We find weakly significant pre-reform differences for promotion 
rates, but no difference for retention rates.  
Finally, Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for outcomes in equation (1). The mean 
difference between the two groups of areas is positive for academic schools, and negative 
for technical and vocational schools. Results are suggestive of disparities in achievement 
between treated and control schools, with negative differences for females from lower socio-
economic backgrounds. 
6.2 Effects on scores 
Table 6 reports the average policy effects obtained by estimating equation (1). Results 
are presented by subject, gender and curricular track. Scores are standardized to have zero 
mean and unit variance, so that effects can be interpreted in points of standard deviation. 
Leaving aside significance, most estimates for academic schools have positive signs, while 
estimates for the remaining schools point to the opposite direction. Effects for academic 
schools are never different from zero. On the contrary we find large, negative effects for 
female students in technical and vocational schools, for both reading and science (-0.4 
points). This sharp difference between curricular tracks is robust to the estimation method 
employed (see Table A.1 of the Appendix). Table 1 implies that number of students “at risk” 
was large, about 40% of the population in the areas considered. Combined with the 
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possibility of a social multiplier, most likely the reform affected the behaviour of the large 
majority of students in the class. This might explain the size of the effect documented, and 
the little within-class heterogeneity in the quantile effects presented below.12 
To make up for lack of pre-reform achievement data, we estimated a value-added 
specification by conditioning on a proxy of student ability (in the spirit of Lavy et al., 2012). 
For each student we considered teachers’ marks at the end of the two semesters of the first 
and second grade at school, for both mathematics and language. We limited the analysis to 
these subjects as they are common across all curricular tracks. We also considered the final 
mark obtained at the end of the lower secondary school. This yielded a total of 8 to 12 marks 
per students, depending of the cohort of enrolment. Importantly, none of these marks is the 
result of standardized assessment. We stacked these indicators, together with scores 
collected through the main survey, and run gender-specific fixed effect regressions 
controlling for subject dummies (mathematics or science, vis-à-vis reading or language), 
nature of the indicator employed (test scores vis-à-vis administrative marks) and age when 
the indicator was measured. We used these regressions to predict each student’s “fixed 
effect”, which we included as an additional control in equation (1). Results in what follows 
are confirmed if we use only marks in periods pre-reform. 
Results from this specification are reported in Table A.2 of the Appendix, and align 
well with the pattern in Table 6. In non-academic schools, only scores for female students 
                                                            
12We investigated the heterogeneity of results allowing the policy effect to vary across groups of students that 
were plausibly more at risk of grade retention under the new progression system. We exploited the variability 
across cohorts of enrolment in the original evaluation design (see Section 4), and selected only students 
enrolled for the first time in the school year 2006/07 (pre-reform). These students completed the first year at 
school under the old regime. We then run the regression in (1) only for this cohort of students, adding a dummy 
to identify students at risk of grade retention and its interaction with the area identifier. We experimented with 
alternative definitions of “students at risk”. First, we considered students who were admitted to the second 
grade with at least one educational debt. Second, we focussed on students having a debt in mathematics, as 
we know from Table 1 that this was, by far, the case most frequently encountered situation. Finally, we labelled 
“at risk” those students who completed the lower secondary school with the minimum score. As expected, 
results from this set of regressions show that students more at risk of grade retention have actually lower test 
scores that their peers in the class. However, we rejected the hypothesis that results in Table 6 vary with risk. 
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are affected. The negative effects documented for reading and science are confirmed, 
although their magnitude is now attenuated (-0.3 points). Most results in Table 6 are 
confirmed for academic schools. The negative effect on reading scores for males, which 
was not statistically different from zero, is now more precisely estimated and significant at 
the conventional level.13 
We tested whether the reform affected achievement across quantiles of the score 
distribution. For example, Figlio and Lucas (2004) show that high standards in the class 
have the largest effects on achievement for students mismatched with the average ability of 
their peers. Figure 5 reports quantile treatment effects (QTEs) for the various groups 
considered, along with the corresponding 95 per cent confidence intervals. For academic 
schools all figures are not statistically different from zero, pointing to homogeneous effects. 
The pattern for non-academic schools also supports the hypothesis of constant effects, but 
with a negative shift in reading and science scores for female students. Overall, the evidence 
documented suggests much lower within track variability in policy effects than between 
tracks. A possible explanation for this result in that school tracking creates homogeneous 
classes with respect to ability and family background.14 
                                                            
13 Conclusions on scores are confirmed using the “PISA sample” (with the caveat about precision 
acknowledged above). Moreover using PISA data we find no significant effects on household spending for 
education, the bulk of which - given the public school system in Italy - consists in fees paid for private tutoring. 
According to our findings, households did not react to the reform providing extra support to students facing 
an increased threat of grade retention. In contrast, we find that the amount of extra time spent by students 
learning subjects outside of normal school hours increased after the reform. Of course this effect could be 
explained as mechanical consequence of the intervention itself, being the provision of remedial classes for 
low achieving students compulsory on the school side. However, our results show that much of the action took 
place in non-academic schools, while in academic schools the provision of remedial classes is unaffected by 
the reform. This evidence supports the idea that the reform lowered the “safety” of the most struggling 
students, imposing substantial extra work loads only for those from low socio-economic backgrounds. 
14 As for average effects, we checked the sensitivity of QTEs to the specification and the estimation method 
adopted. Figure A.1 of the Appendix is the analogue of Figure 5, but is obtained using the semi-parametric 
procedure suggested by Firpo (2010). We additionally derive the analogue of Figure 5 when quantile 
regressions include student fixed effects (see Figure A.2 of the Appendix). 
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6.3 Effects on retention rates 
Moving from the evidence discussed in the previous section, we use administrative 
records to study the effects on retention rates. Results in Table 7 are derived from micro 
data by school and grade. We report separate results for academic and non-academic 
schools. In the latter case, after a matriculation exam at the end of the third year students 
can attain a formal qualification that enables to practice an occupation. Because of this, we 
consider data across curricular types for grades without the matriculation exam (grades 1 to 
4, excluding the third grade in vocational schools). 
We first consider in columns (1) and (4) students for whom the final status (retention 
or promotion) is determined in June. All remaining students have an ‘educational debt’ 
(schools in the province of Trento), or are mandated to summer courses and the remedial 
exam in September (schools outside the province of Trento). Results for promotion rates, as 
determined in June, are reported in columns (2) and (5). Columns (3) and (6) report retention 
rates in June. Equation (2) is first estimated using schools in the “Main Sample” (Panel A), 
and then including all schools in the towns selected (Panel B). 
We find a significant increase in students whose status is determined in June which is 
driven by higher promotion rates – see columns (2) and (5).15 These results imply that 
students admitted to the next grade in the post reform period include those who, before the 
reform, would have the educational debt. Effects for retention rates are never significant 
across all columns – see columns (3) and (6). Consistent with what documented in the first 
two columns of Table 4, estimation results for all schools in towns yield identical 
conclusions. 
                                                            
15 Results for non-academic schools are robust to clustering on school only. Results for academic schools in 
this case become marginally significant. 
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Results in Table 7 are at odds with the evidence documented for scores in the “Main 
Sample”. Despite the negative effects on scores in non-academic schools, these picture an 
increase in number of students admitted to the next grade. The same comment extends to 
academic schools, where no effects on test scores are detected. These findings are consistent 
with changes in schools’ behaviour in the new regime. The reform introduced additional 
administrative burdens related to the organisation of remedial courses and the exam in 
September, leaving school budgets substantially unaffected. Schools reacted by admitting 
to the next grade those students who would otherwise have an ‘educational debt’. 
6.4 Long-term effects  
We use the variability introduced by a different reform that affected upper secondary 
schools during the 1990s, and has many similarities with the intervention considered here. 
Remedial exams for low performing students were introduced in Italian schools in 1923. In 
1994/95 the exam was abolished, and replaced by debito formativo. The last cohort of high 
school graduates before the 1994/95 intervention consists of students born in 1976. For these 
students, remedial exams had substantially the same format as the exams introduced with 
the 2007/08 reform. In this sense, the former reform represents the mirror image of the latter. 
Contrary to the most recent reform, however, the former intervention did not make remedial 
courses mandatory in the formative plan, and therefore did not constrain school financial 
resources.  
We compare cohorts of students born before and after 1976, and use the available 
longitudinal dimension to look at their outcomes. Figure 6 reports official statistics for 
retention rates by grade and curricular type published by ISTAT. The reform year, marked 
with a dot in each profile, is associated with negative spikes at all grades, especially for 
vocational schools. However, leaving aside adjustments around the reform year, the time 
series does not present any evident structural break from the change to the new progression 
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rule. As a result, the risk of grade retention does not seem to have an impact on retention 
rates. Interestingly, we can’t exclude that this finding was also in the information set of 
students, schools and teachers in the cohorts considered for our analysis. 
Figure 7 maintains the same design, but considers graduation rates at the end upper 
secondary school (at age 18/19). Due to the lack of administrative information, graduation 
rates are computed using the 2010 wave of the Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
from the Bank of Italy (Labour Force Survey data yield similar results). No clear 
discontinuity emerges from the figure, for both male and female students.16 
The 1994/95 and the 2007/08 reforms can be considered as exogenous shocks to the 
risk of grade retention; in addition, the latter reform impacted negatively on school budgets 
by making the organisation of remedial courses mandatory. The absence of clear effects of 
the 1994/95 reform, as opposed to the effects documented in Table 6, represents 
corroborative evidence in favour of the role played by changes in school inputs in the most 
recent reform.  
7. Discussion and conclusions 
Heterogeneous effects of the reform on student effort could be one driver of our results. 
Children of advantaged social classes show a more positive attitude towards learning and 
feel more confident in their performance (Boudon, 1974). Lower class families have strong 
risk aversion towards investment in education because of low expected performance (Breen 
and Goldthorpe, 1997). It follows that students from these families, which are over-
                                                            
16 In principle, by adopting the same approach we could shed light of longer term effects on university 
completion and wages. However, cohorts born in the late 70s were also the most affected by a subsequent 
reform of the university system (see, for instance, Cappellari and Lucifora, 2009), that resulted for those 
cohorts into higher graduation rates and, therefore, indirect effects on labour market outcomes (see Figure A.3 
of the on-line Appendix). The discontinuity in Figure 7 for cohorts born in the early 80s follows from another 
reform that, in the late 1990s, introduced new rules for the matriculation exam at secondary school (Legge 10 
November 1997, n. 425). 
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represented in non-academic schools, may be reluctant to additional commitment when 
payoff is uncertain.  
The negative effect on scores is stronger for female students, and more pronounced in 
reading and science. Female students in non-academic schools perform, on average, well 
below their male peers. This applies to mathematics in particular, which may be perceived 
as the subject with the highest return and for which acceptable performance raises the 
chances of grade progression. As girls are more risk-averse to school failures (Borghans et 
al., 2009), the reform may have induced them to invest more in mathematics and exert less 
effort in other subjects. The result is exacerbated by secondary school tracking, which 
creates homogeneous classes according to ability and social background and reduces peer 
effects (see Zimmer, 2003, Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006). Students perform better if their 
peers are high achievers, and good peers can act as a buffer against deviant behaviour. Social 
stigmas may therefore be less important in schools where a non-negligible share of the 
population acts lowering effort. For example, Figlio and Lucas (2004) document sharp 
effects of grading standards for low-ability students when classroom ability is relatively 
high, supporting the idea that high standards improve the achievement of students 
mismatched with the typical ability level of their peers. 
We have discussed how the reform imposed additional administrative burdens, with no 
adjustment to financial resources transferred to schools (OECD, 2013). We have provided 
evidence that schools reacted by admitting to the next grade students whom, in the pre-
reform period, would have an ‘educational debt’. If schools lowered their standards to avoid 
the organization of summer courses and the remedial exam in September, the negative effect 
on test scores can be driven also by adaptive behaviour of students. A competing explanation 
comes from adaptive behaviour of teachers. If principals and the governing bodies of 
schools decide to lower the standards required for progression, teachers could rationally 
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exert lower effort and teach at that standard, with an impact on academic achievement. How 
teachers manage classroom culture (e.g. creating a supportive environment for low-
achieving students) has a strong impact on student motivation and passing rates (Akerlof 
and Cranton, 2003). Adaptive behaviour of both students and teachers may induce a vicious 
circle in non-academic tracks in particular, as students may adjust their commitment to 
academic standards because of the low opportunity cost of dropping out (Breen and 
Goldthorpe, 1997). As teachers work in a highly regulated public sector without pay 
incentives and virtually no risk of sanctions, the temptation to adjust effort to the learning 
attitude of the class may be high. 
These findings raise a number of questions, including what can be done to reinforce 
positive attitudes towards learning for the most disadvantaged students, and whether more 
informed decisions about retention or promotion should rely on standardized testing. We 
hope to address these questions in future work.  
 
References 
Akerlof, G. and Kranton, R. (2002). Identity and schooling: Some lessons for the economics of 
education. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(4),pp. 1167-1201. 
Battistin, E. and Schizzerotto, A. (2012). Threat of Grade Retention, Remedial Education and 
Student Achievement: Evidence from Upper Secondary Schools in Italy. IZA Discussion paper 
7086. 
Battistin, E. and Meroni, E.C. (2013). Should We Increase Instruction Time in Low Achieving 
Schools? Evidence from Southern Italy. IZA Discussion paper 7437. 
Belot, M. and Vandenberghe, V. (2014). Evaluating the “Threat” Effects of Grade Repetition. 
Exploiting the 2001 Reform by the French-Speaking Community of Belgium. Education Economics, 
Volume 22, No. 1, pp. 73-89. 
25 
 
Betts, J.R. and Grogger, J. (2003). The impact of grading standards on student achievement, 
educational attainment, and entry-level earnings. Economics of Education Review, 22(4), pp. 343-
352. 
Bishop, J.H. (2004). Drinking from the fountain of knowledge: Student incentive to study and 
learn-externalities, information problems and peer pressure. CAHRS Working Paper 04-15. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Center for Advanced Human 
Resource Studies. 
Borghans, L., Golsteyn, B. H., Heckman, J.J. and Meijers, H. (2009). Gender differences in risk 
aversion and ambiguity aversion, Journal of European Economic Association, 7, 2-3, pp. 649-658. 
Boudon, R. (1974).Education, opportunity, and social inequality: Changing prospects in western 
society, Wiley: New York. 
Bowles, S., and Gintis, H. (2002). The Inheritance of Inequality, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 16, 3, pp. 3-30. 
Breen, R. and Goldthorpe, J. (1997). Explaining educational differentials: Towards a formal 
rational action theory. Rationality and Society, 9(3),pp. 275-305. 
Calcagno, J.C. and Long, B.T. (2008). The Impact of Postsecondary Remediation Using a 
Regression Discontinuity Approach: Addressing Endogenous Sorting and Noncompliance. NBER 
Working Paper No. 14194. 
Cappellari, L. and Lucifora, C. (2009). The “Bologna Process” and college enrolment decisions, 
Labour Economics, 16, 6, pp. 638-647. 
Carbonaro, W. (2005). Tracking, Students’ Effort, and Academic Achievement. Sociology of 
Education, 78(1), pp. 27–49. 
De Lillo, A., and Schizzerotto, A. (1985). La valutazione sociale delle occupazioni. Una scala 
di stratificazione occupazionale per l’Italia contemporanea, Bologna, Il Mulino. 
De Paola, M., and Scoppa, V. (2014). The effectiveness of remedial courses in Italy: a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design, Journal of Population Economics, 27(3), pp. 65–386. 
26 
 
Englund, H.M., Luckner, A.E., Whaley, G.J.L. and Egeland, B. (2004). Children’s Achievements 
in Early Elementary School: Longitudinal Effects of Parental Involvement, Expectations, and 
Quality of Assistance, Journal of Educational Psychology, 96, 4, pp. 723-730. 
Figlio, D.N. and Lucas, M.E. (2004). Do High Grading Standards Affect Student Performance? 
Journal of Public Economics, 88, pp. 1815-1834. 
Firpo, S. (2010). Efficient Semiparametric Estimation of Quantile Treatment Effects. 
Econometrica, 75(1), pp. 259-276. 
Fortier, M.S., Vallerand, R.J. and Guay, F.(1996). Academic motivation and School 
Performance: Toward a Structural Model, Contemporary Educational Psychology, 20, 3,pp. 257-
274. 
Gipps, C. and Murphy, P. (1994). A Fair Test? Assessment, Achievement and Equity. Open 
University Press. 
Hanushek, E.A. and Wössmann, L. (2006). Does educational tracking affect performance and 
inequality? Differences-in-differences evidence across countries. Economic Journal, 116(510), pp. 
63-76. 
Hastings, J.S., Neilson, C.A. and Zimmerman, S.D. (2012). The Effect of School Choice on 
Intrinsic Motivation and Academic Outcomes. NBER Working Paper No. 18324. 
Heckman, J.J. and Vytlacil, J.E. (2007). Econometric Evaluation of Social Programs, Part I: 
Causal Models, Structural Models and Econometric Policy Evaluation. In Handbook of 
Econometrics, Chapter 70, Volume 6, Part B, pp. 4779-4874. 
Imbens, G.W. (2004). Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects under 
Exogeneity. a Review. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), pp. 4-29. 
Jacob, B.A. and Lefgren, L. (2004). Remedial education and student achievement: A regression-
discontinuity analysis. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), pp. 226-244. 
Jacob, B.A. and Lefgren, L. (2009). The Effect of Grade Retention on High School Completion. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(3), pp. 33-58. 
Jimerson, S.R. (2001). Meta-Analysis of Grade Retention Research: Implications for Practice in 
the 21st Century. School Psychology Review, 30(3), pp. 420-437. 
27 
 
Lavy, V. and Schlosser, A. (2005). Targeted remedial education for underperforming teenagers: 
Costs and benefits. Journal of Labor Economics, 23(4), 839-874. 
Lavy, V. and Schlosser, A. (2011). Mechanisms and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(2), pp. 1-33. 
Lavy, V., Silva, O. and Weinhardt, F. (2012). The Good, the Bad and the Average: Evidence on 
the Scale and Nature of Ability Peer Effects in Schools. Journal of Labor Economics, Volume 30, 
No. 2, pp. 367-414. 
Machin, S. and McNally, S. (2005). Gender and Student Achievement in English Schools. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 21(3), pp. 357-372. 
OECD (2001).Knowledge and skills for life. First results from PISA 2000. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2004).Learning for tomorrow's world. First results from PISA 2003.Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2007). Evidence in education: Linking research and policy. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2012), Programme for international student assessment (PISA). Results from Pisa 2012 
– Country Note, Italy. 
OECD (2013), Education at a Glance, Country Report-Italy, Paris. 
Pintrich, P.R. (2003). A Motivational Science Perspective on the Role of Student Motivation in 
Learning and Teaching Context, Journal of Educational Psychology, 95, 4, pp. 667-686. 
Powney, J. (1996). Gender and Attainment - A Review. Edinburgh: Scottish Council for 
Research in Education. 
Rosenthal, R. and Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the Classroom, New York, Holt, Reinhart 
& Winston. 
Rubie-Davies, C., Hottie, J. and Hamilton, R. (2006). Expecting the best for Students: Teacher 
Expectation and Academic Outcomes, British Journal of Educational Psychology, 76, 3, pp. 429-
444. 
Shavit, Y., and Blossfeld, H.P. (eds) (1993). Persistent Inequality. Changing Educational 
Attainments in Thirteen Countries, Boulder (CO), Westview Press. 
Staddon, J. (1983). Adaptive learning and behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
28 
 
Whelan, C., Layte, R. and Maitre, B. (2002). Multiple deprivation and persistent poverty in the 
European Union. Journal of European Social Policy, 12(2),pp. 91-105. 
Zimmer, R. (2003). A new twist in the educational tracking debate. Economics of Education 
Review, 22(3),pp. 307-315. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on student performance for the school year 2006/07 (pre-reform). 
 Grade 2 Grade 3 
 Males Females Males Females 
   
Academic Schools  
   
% of students retained 8.9 6.4 6.8 5.4 
% of students with debts 42.5 27.2 47.5 28.8 
    in Italian language 11.1 12.4 8.3 8.5 
    in Mathematics 62.0 58.1 43.5 47.2 
    in Foreign Languages 32.9 41.6 24.0 41.2 
     
Technical and Vocational Schools  
   
% of students retained 16.2 14.2 14.5 11.3 
% of students with debts 40.5 32.7 42.6 35.4 
    in Italian language 15.4 11.1 17.3 10.1 
    in Mathematics 46.8 45.9 51.9 47.6 
    in Foreign Languages 36.2 33.1 39.1 37.7 
    
Notes. Administrative data from the Ministry of Education for schools located in the provinces considered (Trento, 
Bolzano, Verona and Vicenza). Figures are presented by gender, curricular type (academic and technical or vocational) 
and grade. See Section 3 for details. 
 
Table 2. Sample size: students, classes and schools (Main Sample). 
 Males Females 
 on off on off 
   
Academic Schools  
   
Students 168 146 281 205 
Classes 23 20 23 20 
Schools 5 4 5 4 
     
Technical and Vocational Schools 
   
Students 266 269 201 222 
Classes 28 28 28 28 
Schools 6 7 6 7 
    
Notes. Sample size by gender, curricular type (academic and technical or vocational) and policy status of the area where 
the school is located (on and off stand for outside and inside the province of Trento, respectively). See Section 4 for 
details.  
  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and balancing tests for the covariates considered (Main Sample). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Academic Schools Technical and Vocational Schools 
 Policy On Policy Off  Policy On Policy Off  
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD Diff Mean SD Mean SD Diff 
           
Student Demographics           
Age 15.837 0.707 15.755 0.671 0.625 16.005 0.807 15.963 0.788 0.774 
Male 0.374 0.484 0.416 0.494 0.511 0.570 0.496 0.548 0.498 0.832 
Born abroad 0.547 0.498 0.443 0.498 0.495 0.124 0.330 0.122 0.328 0.968 
Cohabitating with mother and father 0.130 0.337 0.081 0.274 0.082 0.192 0.394 0.177 0.382 0.642 
School in the place of residence 0.517 0.500 0.456 0.499 0.331 0.261 0.440 0.265 0.442 0.952 
Household Demographics           
Father's age 48.625 5.448 49.061 4.727 0.235 47.963 5.879 47.896 5.639 0.883 
Mother's age 45.404 4.586 46.145 4.371 0.043 44.659 4.999 44.562 5.132 0.798 
Father's education: Secondary 0.530 0.500 0.530 0.500 0.996 0.545 0.499 0.532 0.500 0.730 
Father's education: Tertiary 0.280 0.450 0.332 0.472 0.236 0.083 0.276 0.097 0.296 0.443 
Mother's education: Secondary 0.581 0.494 0.540 0.499 0.281 0.528 0.500 0.632 0.483 0.003 
Mother's education: Tertiary 0.232 0.423 0.341 0.475 0.012 0.093 0.291 0.077 0.268 0.414 
Mother is housewife 0.160 0.367 0.171 0.377 0.642 0.226 0.419 0.229 0.421 0.928 
Mother or father unemployed 0.018 0.135 0.012 0.109 0.495 0.030 0.196 0.026 0.160 0.762 
Wealth and Social Status           
Life-stype deprivation index 0.300 1.083 0.259 1.006 0.521 0.535 1.433 0.583 1.478 0.722 
Occupational prestige scale 51.391 19.314 56.750 19.393 0.011 40.221 17.803 39.524 17.159 0.602 
           
Number of students 449  351   467  491   
           
Notes. Reported are descriptive statistics for the covariates used as controls in the analysis, by curricular type (academic and technical or vocational) and policy status. Columns 
(5) and (10) report p-values for the statistical significance of the difference between columns (1) and (3) and (6) and (8), respectively. Standard errors are clustered on class (see 
Section 6.1 for details). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 4. Balancing tests (administrative data). 
 All Schools Schools in Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Admitted Retained Admitted Retained 
     
     
In Sample 0.0024 -0.0022   
 (0.014) (0.007)   
     
Policy on   -0.0387* 0.0119 
   (0.023) (0.011) 
     
Baseline   0.5033 0.1303 
     
Observations 516 516 85 85 
     
Notes. Estimates of equation (3) are reported in columns (1) and (2) for promotion and retention rates, respectively, 
using all years from 2006/7 to 2009/10. All schools in the towns selected are considered, and observations correspond 
to school/grade/year outcomes. Estimates of equation (4) are reported in columns (3) and (4) for promotion and 
retention rates, respectively, using the only pre-reform year available, 2006/07. Only schools in the sample are 
considered, and observations correspond to school/grade/year outcomes. Baseline figures represent the average of 
outcomes in 2006/07, across grades at secondary school, in towns not affected by the reform. Standard errors are 
clustered on school. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for scores (Main Sample). 
  Males Females 
  On Off On Off 
   
Academic Schools   
    
Reading  Mean 500.670 509.438 521.042 512.092 
 SD 91.090 102.069 98.128 101.102 
Math  Mean 540.312 523.952 498.814 492.304 
 SD 79.690 91.804 91.999 89.734 
Science  Mean 545.119 523.044 520.717 513.828 
 SD 86.278 83.872 86.833 85.055 
      
Technical and Vocational Schools  
    
Reading  Mean 411.271 418.770 407.558 447.144 
 SD 80.488 85.151 85.194 93.376 
Math  Mean 480.705 484.796 413.787 417.886 
 SD 113.330 96.482 115.081 117.043 
Science  Mean 453.240 460.934 418.407 448.835 
 SD 104.739 101.633 89.128 86.668 
     
Notes. Summary statistics by gender, curricular type (academic and technical or vocational) and policy status of the 
area where school is located.  
 
Table 6. Average effects on scores (Main Sample). 
  Reading Mathematics Science 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
    
Academic Schools    
     
  -0.1931 0.1751 0.0657 0.0684 0.1974 0.1287 
  (0.125) (0.138) (0.140) (0.127) (0.140) (0.107) 
        
Technical and Vocational Schools   
     
  0.0286 -0.4320*** -0.0757 -0.0119 -0.0041 -0.4330*** 
  (0.132) (0.126) (0.141) (0.110) (0.126) (0.131) 
      
Notes. Results from equation (1) for separate regressions by gender and curricular type (academic and technical or 
vocational). All regressions include the variables in Table 3, and outcomes are standardized to have zero mean and unit 
variance. Robust standard errors, clustered on class, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 
Table 7. Effects for retention and promotion rates (administrative data). 
 Academic Schools Technical and Vocational 
Schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 In June Admitted Retained In June Admitted Retained 
       
 Panel A. Schools in the sample 
       
Effect 0.1409*** 0.1359*** 0.0049 0.0716*** 0.0666*** 0.0050 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.007) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) 
       
Observations 144 144 144 196 196 196 
       
 Panel B. All schools 
       
Effect 0.1245*** 0.1201*** 0.0044 0.0898*** 0.0795*** 0.0103 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.007) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) 
       
Observations 176 176 176 340 340 340 
       
Notes. Estimates of equation (2), by curricular type, using administrative data (Italian Ministry of Education and local agencies). Promotion and retention rates for 
time/grade/schools cells for years 2006/07 (pre-reform), 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2019/10 (post-reform). Columns (1) and (4) refer to students whose final status (retention or 
promotion to the next grade) is determined in June. Columns (2) and (5) refer to students admitted to the next grade in June. Columns (3) and (6) report retention rates in June. 
Estimation results in Panel A are limited to schools in the sample. Panel B considers all schools in towns selected. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on school and 
enrolment cohort. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Figure 1. Evaluation design. 
 
Notes. The province of Trento (Northern Italy) is the only province not affected by the reform. Four provinces are 
considered: Trento, South Tyrol (North of Trento), Verona (South-West) and Vicenza (South East). An Italian province 
is a territory administratively similar to a US county. We matched the capital Trento to the capital of Tyrol, Bolzano. 
The town of Riva del Garda was matched to Desenzano del Garda, in the province of Verona. The town of Rovereto 
was matched to Schio, in the province of Vicenza. See Section 4 for details. 
  
Figure 2. Population size and age structure in the towns selected. 
 
Panel A. Population size 
 
Panel B. Working age population, 15-64 
 
Panel C. Population 40-64 over population 15-39 
Notes. Panel A is obtained from census data (1921 to 2011). Panel B and Panel C use data from the Italian National 
Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT) from 2002 to 2011. The three pairs of towns in Figure 1 are considered (Trento vs 















































































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)




































































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)


























































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)




Graphs by paired towns
Figure 3. Educational attainment in the towns selected. 
 
Panel A. Percent of immigrants aged 13 to 18 
 
Panel B. Percent of young adults with tertiary education 
 
Panel C. Percent with at least high school diploma 
Notes. Panel A uses data from the Italian National Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT) from 2002 to 2011. Panel B and Panel 
C use census data (1951 to 2011). The three pairs of towns in Figure 1 are considered (Trento vs Bolzano, Riva del 



































































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)



































































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)






































































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)






Graphs by paired towns
Figure 4. Labor market characteristics in the towns selected. 
 
Panel A. NEET population aged 15 to 29 
 
Panel B. Female participation rate 
 
Panel C. Economic activity: percent working in secondary sector 
Notes. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C use census data (1951 to 2011). The three pairs of towns in Figure 1 are 
























































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)






































































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)












































































Trento (off) and Bolzano (on) Riva (off) and Desenzano (on) Rovereto (off) and Schio (on)






Graphs by paired towns
 
Figure 5. Quantile treatment effects for scores (Main Sample). 
Academic Schools 
 




Notes. Reported are estimates of quantile regressions for reading, mathematical and scientific literacy. Results were 
obtained from separate regressions by gender and curricular type (academic and technical or vocational). All 
regressions control for variables in Table 3, and outcomes are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. 




















































Figure 6. Retention rates by cohort of birth (1994 reform). 
 
Notes. Reported are retention rates by cohort of enrollment at secondary school (e.g. 78 stands for “born in 1978” and 
enrolled at age 14), by school grade. Only regions in the Northern/Central part of Italy are considered. The reform year 
is marked with a grey dot. Source: ISTAT (Italian National Bureau of Statistics, before the school year 1997/98) and 
MIUR (Ministry of Education, from the school year 1998/99). See Section 6.4 for details. 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of secondary school graduates by cohort of birth (1994 reform). 
 
Notes. Reported is the percentage of secondary school graduates by cohort of birth, computed from the 2010 Bank of 
Italy Household Survey on Income and Wealth. Cohorts born before 1976 are not affected by the 1994/95 reform of 
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Table A.1. Average effects on scores (sensitivity analysis - Main Sample). 
Academic Schools   
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Males Females Males Females Males Females 
Effect -0.2143 0.1941 0.0325 0.0798 0.1698 0.1296 
 (0.1613) (0.1315) (0.1610) (0.1316) (0.1924) (0.1018) 
Baseline 521.3540 505.7525 532.5818 491.2104 528.2151 512.9147 
 (12.6388) (7.8504) (11.3752) (6.9062) (11.7942) (7.1733) 
       
Technical and Vocational Schools   
 Reading Mathematics Science 
 Males Females Males Females Males Females 
Effect 0.0384 -0.4194 -0.0351 -0.0039 -0.0055 -0.4184 
 (0.1740) (0.1490) (0.1807) (0.1559) (0.1700) (0.1501) 
Baseline 415.6732 447.7098 481.5509 423.1282 459.6394 455.3818 
 (10.8549) (9.7333) (16.4587) (14.8501) (13.6718) (9.8758) 
       
Notes. Results were obtained for groups defined by gender and curricular type (academic and 
technical or vocational), using the propensity score weighting estimator in Imbens (2004) using 
variables in Table 3. Baseline figures refer to reading, mathematical and scientific literacy in areas 
not affected by the reform (province of Trento). The effect is reported in points of standard 
deviation, after having standardized outcomes to have zero mean and unit variance. Standard errors, 
in parentheses, were computed via bootstrap using 200 replications, clustering on class.  
 
Table A.2. Average effects on scores (sensitivity analysis - Main Sample). 
  Reading Mathematics Science 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
    
Academic Schools    
     
  -0.3015 -0.0565 0.0230 -0.1061 0.1144 -0.0629 
  (0.0848) (0.1154) (0.1071) (0.1120) (0.1074) (0.0904) 
        
Technical and Vocational Schools   
     
  0.0340 -0.2945 -0.0767 0.1099 0.004 -0.3107 
  (0.1230) (0.0841) (0.1311) (0.0904) (0.1194) (0.0891) 
      
Notes. Results were obtained from separate regressions by gender and curricular type (academic 
and technical or vocational). All regressions include the variables in Table 3, and a proxy for 
student’s ability obtained as explained in Section 6.2. The effect is reported in points of standard 
deviation, after having standardized outcomes to have zero mean and unit variance. Robust standard 
errors, clustered on class, are reported in parentheses.  
 
Figure A.1. Quantile treatment effects on scores (sensitivity analysis - Main Sample). 
Academic Schools 
 




Notes. Reported are estimates of quantile treatment effects for reading, mathematical and scientific 
literacy. Results were obtained from separate regressions by gender and curricular type (academic 
and technical or vocational), using the method developed in Firpo (2010). Bootstrap standard errors 























































Figure A.2. Quantile treatment effects on scores (sensitivity analysis – Main Sample). 
Academic Schools 
 




Notes. Reported are estimates of quantile regressions for reading, mathematical and scientific 
literacy. Results were obtained from separate regressions by gender and curricular type (academic 
and technical or vocational). All regressions include the variables in Table 3, and a proxy for 
student’s ability obtained as explained in Section 6.2. Bootstrap standard errors based on 200 
replications and clustered on class are used to compute 95% confidence intervals. 


























































Figure A.3. Percentage of university graduates by cohort of birth (1994 reform). 
 
 
Notes. Reported is the percentage of university graduates by cohort of birth computed in 2010 from 
the Bank of Italy Household Survey on Income and Wealth (top panel), and using figures published 
from ISTAT (Italian National Bureau of Statistics: bottom panel). Cohorts born before 1976 are not 
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cohort of birth
Figure A.4. Propensity score distributions by curricular type. 
 
Notes. Reported are predictions from a probit regression of “treatment” dummy on student 
characteristics in Table 3. Separate regressions are estimated by curricular type (academic or 
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